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"[T]hese guys have done some pretty wild stuff. And you know, they
probably do not understand it quite as well as they should. I think that
they have a pretty good understanding of it, but not perfect. And that's
like perfect for us. "'
I. Introduction
A derivative financial instrument (derivative) is a bilateral contract that
is linked to, or derives its value from, the value of an underlying security,
index, or reference rate.2 The derivative securities industry has "boomed"
in the past two years.3 Merrill Lynch & Co., the nation's largest brokerage
firm, experienced a fifty-seven percent increase in derivatives trading
revenue from 1992 to 1993.' The notional value5 of all derivatives contracts
entered into by United States-based commercial banks increased from $11.8
trillion at the end of 1993 to over $15.5 trillion in September of 1994.6
Enthusiasm about derivatives, however, has turned to paranoia because
of recent staggering losses sustained by derivatives end-users.7 In December
1. BT Securities Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7,124, Exchange Act Release No.
35,136, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,477 (Dec. 22, 1994) (quoting derivatives dealer's
comments regarding unsophisticated customer).
2. See infra note 25 and accompanying text (definig derivative financial instrument).
3. See Nicholas Bray, Two Agencies Issue Guidelines on Derivatives, WALL ST. J.,
July 27, 1994, at A6 (describing derivatives market as "booming").
4. Michael Siconolfi, Merrill Lynch Says Derivatives Revenue Swelled 57% to $761
Million Last Year, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1994, at A10.
5. The "notional amount" in a derivatives transaction is the amount of the underlying
asset. See GAO REPORT, infra note 16, at 28 n.7 (explaining notional amounts in derivatives
transactions). Regulators aggregate the notional amount of each derivatives transaction to
determine trends in the derivatives markets. Id. at 28. In a swap agreement, parties calculate
their obligations by multiplying the value of the underlying security, index, or reference rate
(for example, an interest rate) by the notional amount (for example, $10 million). Telephone
Interview with Merrill Lynch & Co. (Feb. 23, 1995); see also infra note 31 (explaining swap
agreements). Generally, parties do not exchange the notional amount in a swap. GAO
REPORT, infra note 16, at 28 n.7 For forwards, futures, and options, regulators use the
amount of the contract as the notional value for measuring the volume of each contract. Id.,
see also infra note 27 (explaining forwards, futures, and options).
6. OFFiCE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 3D QUARTER 1994 CALL REPORT
ON DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES OF UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL BANKS (Feb. 8, 1995) (on file
with the Capital Markets Division of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
7 In the derivatives market, end-users are market participants that enter into deriva-
tives transactions for their own accounts. See mfra note 44 and accompanying text (defining
end-users). End-users use derivatives to manage risks, to speculate on market movements,
to obtain better financing terms, and to diversify their investment portfolios. See infra notes
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1993, a New Y6rk unit of Metallgesellschaft AG, a German company,
reported a loss of over $1 billion resulting from trading m oil-based deriva-
tives.8 In April 1994, Proctor & Gamble Co. (P&G) disclosed that P&G
would take a $157 million charge to cover interest rate derivatives losses
sustained over a period of less than two months.9 In the aftermath of P&G's
announcement, Comnnssioner Richard Roberts of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) correctly predicted that more companies would
soon reveal losses attributable to derivatives trading.' 0 Indeed, by the end
of 1994, several mutual funds, municipalities (most notably Orange County,
California), and companies had announced losses, some of them staggering,
that resulted from derivatives transactions." By August 1994, derivatives
trading had accounted for nearly $6.4 billion m losses since 1993.12
A number of end-users that suffered large losses due to derivatives
transactions filed suit against the dealers that sold them the derivatives. 3
48-52 and accompanying text (describing ways in which end-users use derivatives).
8. Bray, supra note 3, at A6.
9. Gabriella Stem & Steve Lipm, Proctor & Gamble to Take a Charge to Close Out
Two Interest-Rate Swaps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1994, at A3.
10. Roberts Sees More Losses From Derivatives Trading, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1994,
at Cl.
11. See Karen Slater Damato, Examnming Your Mutual Funds for Derivatives Risk,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1994, at Cl (listing mutual funds that suffered heavy losses in deriva-
tives); G. Bruce Knecht, I Owe U.. How a Texas College Mortgaged its Future in Derivatives
Debacle, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1994, at Al (explaining how college's investment portfolio
lost half its value over nine month period due to decrease m value of derivatives); G. Bruce
Knecht, Pied Piper: Minneapolis Investors Are Hurt.by Local Firm They Knew as Cautious,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1994, at Al (reporting that institutional funds managed by Piper
Jaffray suffered $700 million in losses due to decrease m value of derivatives); James P
Miller, -Air Products Takes a Charge of $60 Million, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1994, at A3
(reporting that Air Products & Chemicals Inc. took $60 million charge to reflect declining
value of derivatives); Orange County Crisis - Local Heroes: Public Finance Chiefs Are Very
Often Bonng; That's the Good News, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1994, at Al (reporting that nearly
20 municipalities m Ohio have claimed losses of $14 million incurred m derivatives trans-
actions).
12. See Randall Smith & Steven Lipm, Beleaguered Giant: As Derivatives Losses Rise,
Industry Fights to Avert Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at Al (reporting losses m
derivatives transactions).
13. See Knecht, supra note 11, at Al (reporting that Odessa College sued derivatives
dealer to recover $11 million m derivatives trading losses); Steven Lipm, Bankers Trust Sued
on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1994, at Cl (reporting that Gibson Greetings Inc.
sued derivatives dealer to recover $23 million in derivatives trading losses);. Paulette Thomas,
Proctor & Gamble Sues Bankers Trust Because of Huge Losses on Derivatives, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 28, 1994, at A6 (reporting that Proctor & Gamble Co. sued derivatives dealer to recover
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The end-users claimed that they had not understood what they were buying
and accused the dealers of taking advantage of the end-users' ignorance. 4
In November 1994, one such end-user, Gibson Greetings, Inc., settled its
suit against BT Securities Corporation, a derivatives dealer, for $14 mil-
lion. '5
On May 18, 1994, the General Accounting Office (GAO), in response
to a request from Congress, issued a report (GAO Report) on derivatives
activity 16 The GAO Report concluded that current over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives trading practices posed a serious danger to the financial system
of the United States and called for formal regulations governing OTC deriva-
tives trading.17
In response to the heightened-concern about insufficient OTC deriva-
tives controls, members of Congress introduced six bills during the first
seven months of 1994 that would provide for enhanced supervision of, and
limitations on, OTC derivatives trading.'" The bills propose a wide range
$130 million in derivatives trading losses).
14. See G. Bruce Knecht, The Lawyers' Turn: Derivatives Are Going Through Crucial
Test: A Wave of Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at Al (reporting that customers m
derivatives lawsuits alleged that derivatives dealers took advantage of customers' lack of
sophistication).
15. See Steven Lipm, Gibson Greetings Reaches Accord in Suit Against Bankers Trust
Over Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Nov 25, 1994, at A2 (reporting that Gibson Greetings Inc.
settled suit with derivatives dealer). Gibson Greetings lost over $20 million m derivatives
transactions recommended by BT Securities Corp. Id. The settlement provided that Gibson
would have to pay only $6.2 million of those losses. Id.
16. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO
PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
17 Id. at 123-24.
18. See S. 2291, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (1994) (limiting FDIC insured mstitu-
tion's ability to purchase, sell, or engage in any transaction involving derivative financial
instrument); H.R. 4745, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1994) (providing framework for SEC
supervision and regulation of all derivatives activities including counterparty agreements);
H.R. 4503, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1994) (calling for establishment of substantially
similar oversight guidelines for federally insured financial institutions engaged in transactions
involving derivative financial products by federal regulatory agencies and mandating risk
evaluation procedures for federally insured financial institutions); S. 2123, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 2 (1994) (amending Federal Deposit Insurance Act to prohibit federally insured insti-
tutions and their affiliates from engaging in nonhedgmg transactions involving derivative
financial instruments); H.R. 4170, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1994) (providing for delineated
disclosure requirements of derivative financial instruments by federally insured financial
institutions); H.R. 3748, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1994) (establishing Federal Derivatives




of -solutions, ranging from the creation of a Federal Derivatives Commis-
sion 9 to a general prohibition forbidding banks from engaging m derivatives
transactions that do not qualify as "hedging."' The 103d Congress, how-
ever, never voted on the proposals. Early in 1995, members of the House
of Representatives introduced two more bills governing derivatives.21
Tins Note analyzes the state of OTC derivative securities sales practice,
including the current regulatory scheme and proposed revisions. Part II of
this Note defines derivative financial instruments and describes their associ-
ated risks and benefits.' Part I examines the current regulatory framework
governing broker-dealer sales practice m OTC derivatives transactions and
analyzes the GAO Report and pending legislation providing for stricter regu-
lation.' Part IV evaluates the present and proposed schemes for regulating
broker-dealer sales practice m OTC derivatives transactions. 24
II. Derivatives Basics
A derivative financial instrument is a bilateral contract that is linked to,
or derives its value from, the value of an underlying security, index, or ref-
erence rate (an underlying).' Underlymgs can include securities, coimodi-
ties, indexes, currency rates, and interest rates.' Every derivatives transac-
tion includes options, forward-based instruments, or a combination of both.27
19. See H.R. 3748, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1994) (proposing establishment of
"Federal Derivatives'Commission").
20. See S. 2123, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1994) (proposing amendment of Federal
Deposit Insurance Act to generally prohibit, with some exceptions, FDIC insured institutions
from engaging in any transaction involving derivatives). Hedging is a risk management
technique. See infra note 48 (defining hedging).
21. See H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995) (establishing Federal Derivatives
Commission to promulgate principles and standards for federal oversight of federally insured
financial institutions); H.R. 31, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101, 301, 401, 501 (1995)
(providing for increased disclosure of derivatives positions by financial institutions, for
certain insolvency reforms concerning derivatives, for international regulatory cooperation,
and for new study of speculation, margin, and collateral requirements by GAO).
22. See nfra notes 25-91 and accompanying text (describing derivatives).
23. See infra notes 92-208 and accompanying text (examining current and proposed
regulatory frameworks for oversight of derivatives).
24. See infra notes 209-35 and accompanying text (evaluating current and proposed
schemes for regulating derivatives).
25. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 24 (defining derivative financial instrument).
26. See id. (listing examples of underlying assets in derivative instruments).
27 See GROUP OF THIRTY, infra note 62, at 29 (stating that options and forward-based
instruments are "building blocks" of all derivatives). An option contract gives the option
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Market participants can, and often do, combine simple derivatives, such as
options,2 futures,29 and forwards' to form more complex instruments, such
as swaps," caps, floors, collars,32 and others.33
holder, m exchange for payment of a premium, the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell
an underlying (or settle the value for cash) at a price, called the strike price, during a time
period or on a specific date. Id. at 32. Forward-based instruments include both forward
contracts and futures contracts. Id. at 30, 32. A forward contract is an "over-the-counter"
agreement that obligates one counterparty to buy, and the other to sell, a specific underlying
at a specific price, amount, and date. Id. at 30. Futures are a type of forward-based contract
that trade on organized exchanges. Id. at 32. Futures differ from forwards in that the terms
of a futures contract are standardized, while the terms of a forward contract are not stan-
dardized, but instead left to the parties to determine. Id. at 30, 32. Exchanges regulate the
trading of futures and some option contracts, while market participants negotiate forward
contracts and other option contracts privately, that is, over-the-counter. See GAO REPORT,
supra note 16, at 4-5 (describing ways in which market participants trade derivatives).
28. See supra note 27 (discussing options); see generally THE OPTIONS INST., CHCAGO
BD. OPTIONS EXCH., OPTIONS: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND TRADING STRATEGIES (1990)
(same) [hereinafter THE OPTIONS INST.].
29. See supra note 27 (describing futures); see generally TODD LOFTON, GETrING
STARTED IN FTREs (1989) (discussing futures and providing comprehensive bibliography).
30. See supra note 27 (describing forward contracts).
31. See GROUP OF THIRTY, infra note 62, at 31 (describing swaps). A swap transaction
is an over-the-counter bilateral agreement obligating two parties to exchange a series of
payments at specified intervals known as settlement dates. Id. Parties either fix the payments
of a swap or, more commonly, calculate the payments for each settlement date by multiplying
the quantity of the underlying (the notional amount) by specified reference rates or prices.
Id. Each party to a swap makes payments calculated by a different formula. Id. Parties
generally net interim payments, with one party paying the difference to the other. Id. In
simplest terms, a swap is a series of forward contracts. Id.
32. See id. at 33 (describing caps, floors, and collars). Like a swap, a cap transaction
entails a series of periodic payments. Id. The buyer of a cap instrument pays a premium to
the seller and at each payment date, receives from the seller a payment equal to the differ-
ence, if positive, between a reference rate (which is variable) and a strike rate ("cap") multi-
plied by a notional amount. Id. A floating-rate borrower might use a cap to protect against
a rise in interest rates. Id. A floor contract is the opposite of a cap in that the seller must pay
the buyer only if the difference between the reference rate and the strike rate (here, the
"floor") is negative. Id. Therefore, a floor protects a floating-rate investor against a decline
in interest rates. Id. Buying a collar is equivalent to buying a cap and selling a floor. Id.
33. See id. at 30-34 (describing complex derivatives). Other types of complex deriva-
tives include "swaptions" (options on swaps) and options on futures contracts. See id. at 33-
34 (describing swaptions and futures options). Some market participants include within the
definition of derivatives a wide variety of debt instruments that have pay-off characteristics
reflecting embedded derivatives (for example, "structured notes"), or have option character-
istics, or are created by "stripping" particular components of other instruments such as
principal or interest payments. See id. at 29 (describing financial instruments that might meet
the definition of "derivative").
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As with any contract, each derivatives transaction involves at least, and
usually no more than, two parties, called counterparties. 4 In addition, a de-
rivatives contract obligates both counterparties to undertake some perfor-
mance.3" In a transaction involving an exchange-traded derivative, the
central exchange is a counterparty 36
Participants in the derivatives market fall into two distinct categories:
broker-dealers (dealers) and end-users.37 Dealers act in two capacities.
First, dealers sell derivatives contracts involving other counterparties.3" For
example, a dealer might sell to a client a derivative instrument to which the
Federal Home Mortgage Association is a counterparty '9 Second, dealers
offer and enter into derivatives transactions in which the dealers themselves
are counterparties. 4 For example, swaps dealers commonly quote bids and
offers at which they are willing to enter into swaps as a counterparty 41 De-
rivatives dealers include banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and
affiliates of each.42 Dealers normally profit from derivatives trading by
charging fees or earning returns from bid-ask spreads.43
In derivatives transactions, end-users are the counterparties that are not
dealers." End-users can include corporations, financial institutions, govern-
34. See id. at 30 (calling parties to derivatives transaction "counterparties").
35. See supra notes 27, 31, 32 (describing rights and obligations of participants m
various derivatives transactions).
36. See GROUP OF THIRTY, mfra note 62, at 32 (stating that exchanges are parties to
derivatives contracts traded on organized exchanges).
37 See id. at 34 (categorizing all derivatives market participants as either dealers or
end-users).
38. See id. at 41 (explaining dealer's role m brokering derivatives transaction between
counterparties).
39. See Telephone Interview with Merrill Lynch & Co. (Feb. 23, 1995) (describing
dealer-customer relationships m OTC derivatives market).
40. See GROUP OF THIRTY, infra note 62, at 42 (describing evolution of derivatives
dealer's role from broker to counterparty).
41. Christopher L. Culp & Robert J. Mackay, Regulating Denvatives: The Current
System and Proposed Changes, REGULATION, Fall 1994, 38, 39 (describing participants m
OTC derivatives markets).
42. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 30 (listing types of institutions that act as
derivatives dealers).
43. See GROUP OF THRTY, mfra note 62, at 42 (describing ways m which dealers profit
from derivatives trading). Normally, derivatives dealers structure their asking prices for
entering into derivatives transactions to include a margin of profit. Id.
44. See id. at 34 (stating that derivatives market participants are either dealers or end-
users).
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ment entities, individual investors, and institutional investors.45 Dealers sell
derivatives to, and enter into derivatives contracts with, end-users. 46 Partici-
pants m the derivatives market are often both dealers and end-users.47
A. Uses of Denvatives
End-users can use derivatives in at least four ways. First, end-users can
use derivatives to manage risk by "hedging"'4 against adverse changes in the
values of the underlying assets or other related investments within a port-
folio.49 Second, end-users can use derivatives to speculate on anticipated
changes in the values of the underlying assets.' ° Third, end-users can use
derivatives to obtain better financing terms."' Finally, end-users can use
derivatives to diversify their investment portfolios. 2
45. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 29 (listing classes of derivatives market par-
ticipants that act as end-users).
46. See supra notes 39, 41 and accompanying text (describing transactions between
dealers and end-users).
47 See GROUP OF THIRTY, infra note 62, at 34 (stating that participants in derivatives
market may act as both dealer and end-user). But see GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 29-30
(implying that participants in derivatives market are either dealers or end-users, but not both).
48. See JOSEPH D. KOZIOL, HEDGING PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND STRATEGIES FOR
THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 3 (1990) (defining hedging as process of dynamically managing
risks by using "offset mechanism"). For example, if the value of a position decreases by
$100, the offset mechanism (the hedge) should increase in value by $100. Id. Likewise, if
a position increases in value by $500, the value of the hedge should decrease by $500. Id.
49. See id. at 4-6 (observing that four basic methods of establishing hedges all involve
use of derivatives). Specifically, hedging involves contractual agreements (including swaps),
forward contracts, futures contracts, and options contracts. Id.
50. See THE OPTIONS INST., supra note 28, at 69-82 (describing speculation strategies
involving derivatives).
51. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 25 (observing that some derivatives enable
market participants to obtain better financing terms). Derivatives allow market participants
to improve their financing terms by enabling participants to work together to take advantage
of differences in the rates and terms under which participants borrow money Id. In addi-
tion, derivatives enable participants to more effectively and efficiently hedge their risks, and
thereby improve their creditworthiness. Id.
52. See James E. Rhodes & Carol W Proffer, To Hedge or Not to Hedge? (Parts I &
I1), in MANAGING CURRENCY RISK 4, 5, 10 (Mark P Kritznan & Katrina F Sherrerd eds.,
1989) (explaining that ability to hedge currency risk encourages investment in foreign markets
and that three most commonly used methods of hedging currency risk all involve derivatives).
But see Fischer Black, Universal Hedging, in MANAGING CURRENCY RISK, supra, at 28-30
(asserting that because currency rate movements often correlate to market movements, some
indirect currency risk is unavoidable notwithstanding use of derivatives).
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Investing m some derivatives can be more cost-effective than investing
m the underlying assets. For example, an option to buy or sell an underly-
ing asset usually costs a fraction of the price of the underlying asset.53
Because investing m derivatives often involves a great deal of leverage,
derivatives can offer investors much higher returns than nonderivative
instruments when the market moves in a favorable direction.' The con-
verse, however, also is true. Losses are proportionally much higher when
the market moves m an unfavorable direction.55
B. Risks Involved in Denvatives Transactions
The risks involved in derivatives trading - market risk,56 credit nsk,5
53. See Lee Berton, Understanding the Complex World of Derivatives, WALL ST. J.,
June 14, 1994, at Cl (observing that option's price is usually small percentage of underlying
asset's value).
54. See id. (noting that leverage factor m transaction involving option can magnify
gains m value of option). For example, suppose that the price of ABC's stock is $50/share
and that the price of a 90-day call option on ABC's stock, with a strike price of $50, is
$2/option. See Telephone Interview with Merrill Lynch & Co. (Feb. 23, 1995) (explaining
leverage in options transactions). An investor, with $10,000 to invest, expects the price of
that stock to rise to $55/share during the next three months. Id. The investor can either buy
200 shares of ABC's stock at $50/share or 5,000 call options at $2/option for $10,000. Id.
Suppose, as the investor hoped, that the price of ABC's stock rises to $55/share during
the three month period. Id. If the investor had purchased 200 shares of stock at $50/share
and sold them at $55/share, the investor would realize a $1,000 profit. Id. On the other,
hand, if the investor had purchased 5,000 options at $2/option and sold the options at market
value, the investor would enjoy a $15,000 profit. Id. As the stock's price increases, the
value of that stock's call options also rises. Id. In this case, the lowest reasonable price of
a call option with a strike price of $50 is $5 (the stock price, $55/share, minus the option
strike price, $50). Id. Therefore, the investor's 5,000 options would be worth a total of
$25,000, yielding a $15,000 profit for the investor's initial $10,000 investment. Id. In
summary, the investor would achieve a 10% return by investing in ABC's stock, compared
with a 150% return by investing the same amount of money m the corresponding call op-
tions. Id.
55. Telephone Interview with Merrill Lynch & Co. (Feb. 23, 1995). For example,
using the fact scenario from note 54, supra, if the investor purchased 5,000 options exer-
cisable at $50/share and the price of ABC's stock fell and remained at $49/share, the options
would be worthless and the investor would lose the entire $10,000 investment. Id. By
contrast, if the investor had purchased the actual stock at $50/share, the investor would lose
only $200, or 2% of the investment. Id.
56. See nfra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (defining and describing market risk
in derivatives transactions).
57 See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (defining" and describing credit risk
in derivatives transactions).
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operational risk,5" and legal risk59 - are identical to the risks involved m
many other traditional financial activities.' Risks associated with deriva-
tives, however, are more difficult to measure.61 The Group of Thirty, an
international financial policy organization composed of representatives of
central banks, the financial industry, and academia, described the types of
risks involved m derivatives transactions m a 1993 study 62
The Group of Thirty's study defined "market risk" as the exposure to
a change m the value of a derivative when market conditions change.63 If a
derivative is part of a portfolio, the overall exposure of the portfolio deter-
mines the market risk.64 The GAO Report observed that the many factors
that affect market risk make measuring and managing market risk "difficult"
and "extremely complicated," especially in cases involving large and diverse
portfolios.65
58. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (defining and describing operational
risk in derivatives transactions).
59. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (defining and describing legal risk in
derivatives transactions).
60. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 44 (noting similarity of risks inherent in
derivatives and other financial transactions); GROUP OF THIRTY, infra note 62, at 43 (same);
Culp & Mackay, supra note 41, at 6 (same).
61. Telephone Interview with Merrill Lynch & Co. (Jan. 30, 1995); see infra notes 65,
68 and accompanying text (describing difficulties in assessing risk in derivatives transactions).
Derivatives dealers use sophisticated computer models to value derivatives and predict price
trends. Telephone Interview with Merrill Lynch & Co., supra.
62. See THE GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, 43-52
(1993) (describing risks involved in derivatives transactions).
63. See id. at 43-44 (defining market risk in derivatives transactions). The Group
of Thirty's study identified six factors that determine the market risk of a derivative:
(1) "absolute price or rate risk," which is the exposure to a change in the value of the
derivative (or portfolio) corresponding to a given change in the price of an underlying;
(2) "convexity risk," which is the risk that arises when the relationship between a change in
the value of a derivative (or portfolio) and the price of the underlying is not linear;
(3) "volatility risk," which is the exposure to a change in the value of a derivative (or port-
folio) resulting from a given change in the expected volatility of the price of the underlying;
(4) "time decay risk," which is the exposure to a change in the value of a derivative (or
portfolio) arising from the passage of time; (5) "basis or correlation risk," which is the
exposure to a change m the value of a derivative (or portfolio) resulting from differences m
the price performance of the sub-derivatives (or derivatives) that the derivative (or portfolio)
contains, and their hedges; and (6) "discount rate risk," which is the exposure to a change in
the value of a derivative (or portfolio) corresponding to a change in the rate discounting
future cash flows. Id.
64. Id. at 43.
65. GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 60-61.
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"Credit risk" is the risk of loss due to a counterparty's default on a
derivatives contract.6 Determining the credit risk involved in a single deriv-
atives transaction often requires a participant to evaluate both current and
potential credit exposures because the credit exposure can change dramat-
ically over the life of a derivative.67 Determining the credit risk involved in
a portfolio, on the other hand, requires a complex assessment of offsetting
exposures, netting agreements with each particular counterparty, and the
timing relationship among transactions in order to produce peak maximum
potential exposures at different times.6" "Operational risk," according to the
Group of Thirty, is the risk of loss occurring as a result of inadequate sys-
tems and control, human error, or management failure on the part of a
partiipant.69 The Group of Thirty further noted that the complexity in-
volved in many derivatives transactions requires special emphasis on main-
taming adequate controls to assess and monitor both the transactions and the
aggregate position:of a derivatives market participant. 70
"Legal risk" is the risk of loss because a derivatives contract is legally
unenforceable, including risks arising from msufficient documentation, in-
sufficient capacity or authority of a counterparty, uncertain legality, and
66. See id. at 52 (defining credit risk); GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 62, at 47 (same);
Culp & Mackay, supra note 41, at 40 (same).
67 See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 62, at 47 (noting two questions that one should
ask when assessing credit risk involved in individual derivatives contract). According to the
Group of Thirty, one must ask two questions: (1) "If a counterparty was to default today,
what would it cost to replace the transaction?" and (2) "If a counterparty defaults at some
other point in the future, what is a reasonable estimate of the potential replacement cost?"
Id. Credit risk exposures in a derivatives transaction can change rapidly and dramatically,
especially in highly leveraged situations. Id. at 52-54.
68. See id. at 48-49 (explaining factors used in determining-credit risk of entire port-
folio which include transactions with more than one counterparty).
69. See id. at 50 (defining operational risk). The Group of Thirty study also listed
examples of internal controls that participants engaged in derivatives trading commonly use:
(1) oversight by informed and involved senior management, (2) documentation of standard
policies and operating procedures including limits and exceptions, credit controls, and
management reports, (3) independent risk management (analogous to credit review and
asset/liability committees) that provides senior management with validation of results and
utilizations of limits, (4) independent internal audits that verify adherence to the firm's
policies and procedures, (5) technology and systems for handling day-to-day events, and (6) a
system of independent checks and balances throughout the transaction process, from front-
office initiation of a trade to final payment settlement. Id.
70. Id. at 57; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 67 (stating that complexity of
denvatives transactions makes developing adequate risk management procedures'and controls
difficult).
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unenforceability due to bankruptcy or insolvency " The GAO Report
observed that some derivatives face uncertain treatment under the gambling
laws of some countries.72 Derivatives involve more legal risk than standard
financial transactions because of the innovative quality of derivatives.73
Experts have -suggested that derivatives also present "liquidity risk,"
which can involve both "market liquidity risk" and "funding risk. "74 "Mar-
ket liquidity risk" is the risk that a large transaction in a particular instru-
ment could have an adverse impact on market price.75 "Funding risk," on
the other hand, is the risk that problems in a participant's internal cash flow
may cause contractual nonperformance and force the liquidation of the
participant's position.76
C. A Companson of Exchange-Traded Denvatives and OTC Denvatives
Exchange-traded derivatives, such as futures and sorne options, offer
the advantage of a central clearing house - the exchange itself.7 Com-
71. See GROUP OF THMRTY, supra note 62, at 51 (describing various types of legal risks
in derivatives transactions). See generally LAURENCE D. DOBOSH & FLORENCE D. NOLAN,
CERTAIN ISSUES RELATING TO ENFORCEABILITY OF OTC DERIVATIVES (1994) (discussing
legal risks in OTC derivatives transactions). For example, in January 1991, the United King-
dom House of Lords held that a London borough lacked the necessary capacity to enter into
interest rate swap contracts that the borough had entered into during the 1980s and, therefore,
did not have to fulfill the contracts. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 62, at 51.
72. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 65 (noting that gambling laws of Brazil, Can-
ada, and Singapore may forbid sale of some types of derivatives).
73. See id. at 64-65 (observing that uncertainty lingers over legality of some forwards
contracts and netting agreements). The GAO Report noted that notwithstanding the adoption
of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992),
a risk that a swap contract violates the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (Supp.
V 1993), still exists because a court might hold that the swap is an illegal off-exchange futures
contract. Id. For an in-depth treatment of the effects of the Futures Trading Practices Act
of 1992 on the derivatives markets, see Rebecca Leon, Note, The Regulation of Derivatives
and the Effect of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 321 (1994).
74. See Culp & Mackay, supra note 41, at 41 (stating that institutions engaged in deriv-
atives transactions can face two types of liquidity risks); see also GROUP OF THIRTY, supra
note 62, at 46-47 (categorizing liquidity risks as market risks).
75. See Culp & Mackay, supra note 41, at 41 (describing market liquidity risk).
76. See id. (describing funding risk). Culp and Mackay stated that a failure in funding
risk management was responsible for the $1.3 billion loss reported by Metallgesellschaft AG.
Id. Specifically, the authors cited Metallgesellschaft's inability to generate cash to finance
variation margin payments on futures positions that were hedging OTC transactions as the
cause for the enormous losses. Id.
77 See supra note 27 (explaining organized exchanges); see also DONALD J.
MATHIESON ET AL., MANAGING FINANCIAL RISKS IN INDEBTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9
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monly, only "clearing" members may make trades through the exchange,
and other members or investors must transact through clearing brokers."
Clearing members traditionally impose margin requirements on their custom-
ers that are analogous to performance bonds and hereby reduce the credit
risk involved in the transactions.7 9 However, because a typical margin
agreement requires a participant to post both an initial margin outlay and
subsequent daily maintenance outlays,"m exchange-traded derivatives can
impinge on a participant's cash flow throughout the life of the contract."1 On
the other hand, OTC derivatives transactions usually provide for the settle-
ment of profit or loss either at the expiration of the contract or at infrequent
ifftervals.Y
Exchanges often subject clearing brokers to net worth requirements and
other conditions designed to reduce credit risks.8 3 In addition, as a clearing-
house, the exchange is a party in every contract and guarantees contract
performance.' The exchange-traded derivatives markets also offer the
advantage of more liquidity than the OTC derivatives market and thereby
allow participants to more quickly adjust their positions as economic condi-
tions change.'
(1989) (comparing exchange-traded derivatives contracts with OTC derivatives transactions).
78. See MATHIESON ET AL., supra note 77, at 9 n.24 (observing that only "clearing"
members of exchange may clear trades through clearinghouse).
79. See id. (stating that clearing members often impose additional margin requirements
on their customers, thereby reducing credit risk involved in transactions).
80. See id. at 32-33 (observing that acquiring futures market position in 200 contracts
of sugar would require initial outlay of $700,000 and could require daily maintenance margin
outlays of up to $112,000).
81. See d. (noting that holding futures market position could require daily maintenance
outlays).
82. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 62, at 31 (observing that swaps normally provide
for payments at infrequent intervals); Dean D'Onofno, Using Derivatives to Execute Cur-
rency Strategies, In MANAGING CURRENCY RISK, supra note 52, at 54-55 (comparing settle-
ment in forward contracts and futures contracts).
83. See MATHIESON ET AL., supra note 77, at 9 (observing that exchanges commonly
impose requirements designed to reduce credit risks on clearing members).
84. See id. (noting that because exchanges are parties to each derivatives contract traded
on exchanges, credit risk involved in exchange-traded derivatives is minimal). The resources
of the exchange, rather than those of any single individual trader, guarantee each transaction.
Id.
85. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 62, at 32 (observing that exchange-traded
derivatives market is more liquid than OTC derivatives market); MATHIEsON ET AL., supra
note 77, at 9 (same).
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Unlike exchange-traded derivatives that fix transaction terms such as
quantity and duration, the parties in an OTC transaction fix their own
terms.s6 This "customization" allows parties to acquire more efficient hedg-
ing positions.87 In addition, OTC derivatives entail higher credit risks than
exchange-traded derivatives because settlement of an entire OTC transac-
tion's profit or loss normally occurs either at expiration of the contract or at
infrequent settlement dates.88 Consequently, the size of payments m typical
OTC derivatives contracts greatly exceeds the payments in exchange-traded
contracts.8 9 Compared with exchange-traded derivatives, OTC derivatives
typically require higher administrative maintenance because of their com-
plexity and lack of central clearing.' Therefore, using OTC derivatives
usually costs more than using exchange-traded derivatives.9
II. Current and Proposed Laws and Regulations Governing Dealer
Sales Practices in OTC Derivatives Transactions
The current regulatory framework governing sales practices in OTC
derivatives transactions consists of an overlapping scheme of banking regula-
tory agencies, the SEC (through the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers (NASD)), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commssion (CFTC).
Laws regulating sales practice generally fall into two categories: antifraud
provisions and suitability requirements. Antifraud provisions forbid the use
of untruthful or misleading information and the omission of material in-
formation in connection with the sale of certain derivatives. Suitability
requirements, on the other hand, impose a duty on dealers to ensure that a
proposed transaction is appropriate for a customer.
86. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 24 (observing that parties can "customize"
OTC derivatives transactions); GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 62, at 30 (stating that parties
customize terms of forward contracts and swap agreements); MATHIESON ET AL., supra note
77, at 8 (observing that parties can "customize" .OTC derivatives transactions).
87 See D'Onofrio, supra note 82, at 54 (stating that because forward contracts can
entail virtually any currency, size, and maturity, forward contracts are ideal for most cash-
flow hedgers, especially banks).
88. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 62, at 31 (observing that swaps normally provide
for payments at infrequent intervals); D'Onofrio, supra note 82, at 54-55 (explaining that
typical payment arrangements in forward contracts provide for cash settlement at close of
transaction).
89 See D'Onofio, supra note 82, at 55 (comparing payment arrangements in forward
contracts and futures).
90. See id. (enumerating disadvantages of using forward contracts).
91. See id. (stating that lack of central clearing entailed in forward contracts requires
participants to have good back office to trade at low administrative costs).
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A. A Summary of Current Laws and Regulations Affecting
OTC Denvatives Dealers
The GAO Report identified three distinct groups of dealers in the OTC
derivatives market: (1) dealers that are federally insured financial institutions
or affiliated with such financial institutions, (2) dealers that are subject to
federal securities or commodities regulators, and (3) other dealers. 92 Partici-
pants in the first group include banks, thrifts, and certain bank affiliates.9'
Participants in the second group include registered securities dealers and
futures commission merchants (FCMs).9 Participants in the third group
include the "unregulated" dealers - those not subject to regulation by either
bank regulators or securities and commodity regulators.'
As with all financial regulation in the United States, the regulatory
scheme that governs participants involved in derivatives transactions is bifur-
cated.96 Federal agencies subject derivatives dealers to both "institutional"
regulation and "functional" regulation. 7 Institutional regulation is the regu-
lation of participants' financial status and activities.98 Examples of institu-
tional regulation include restrictions on permissible activities, obligations to
disclose financial information, and minmum capital requirements. 99 Func-
tional regulation is the regulation of transactions of financial instruments and
the markets in which the instruments trade."° Examples of functional regu-
lation include transparency and price reporting obligations, antifraud and
antimampulation restrictions, position limits, and suitability requirements.01
92. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 69-91 (distinguishing participants subject to
bank regulators from participants not subject to bank regulators).
93. See d. at 69, 85 (observing that federal bank regulators oversee nationally and state
chartered banks, thrifts, bank holding companies, and bank affiliates); see also infra notes
166-69 (describing statutory basis for jurisdiction of federal bank regulators).
94. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 85 (identifying derivatives dealers regulated
by SEC and CFTC, but not by bank regulators).
95. See id. at 86 (identifying "unregulated" dealers as dealers not subject to either bank
regulators or to securities and commodity regulators).
96. See Culp & Mackay, supra note 41, at 41 (describing derivatives regulatory
framework as bifurcated).
97 See d. (observing that regulations governing derivatives participants include both
"institutional" regulation and "functional" regulation).
98. See id. (describing "institutional" regulation as regulation of institutions alone, as
opposed to regulation of financial instruments or markets in general).
99. See id. at 9, 14 (listing examples of "institutional" regulation).
100. See id. at 9, 16 (describing "functional" regulation as regulation of financial prod-
ucts and markets, as opposed to regulation of users of those products and markets).
101. See id. at 16 (listing examples of "functional" regulation).
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The focus of this Note, sales practice regulation, falls within the class of
functional regulation.
1 Regulation of Derivatives Dealers Sales Practice by the
SEC and CFTC
a. Suitability Requirements
The SEC, through the NASD, imposes suitability requirements on OTC
derivatives dealers that are registered securities dealers.l" Section 2(a) of
the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice (RFP)03 provides that m recommending
to any customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a dealer
must have a reasonable belief that the recommendation is "suitable" for the
customer."° In addition, RFP Section 2(b) requires a dealer to make rea-
sonable efforts to obtain a "non-institutional" customer's financial status, tax
status, investment objectives, and any other information considered to be
reasonable in recommending securities transactions before the dealer exe-
cutes the transactions. 05 Under Article V of the RFP, the NASD may ma-
pose sanctions including censure, fines, and suspension or revocation of
membership for violations of the RFP by a member dealer."es The RFP
suitability provisions most likely apply only to the sale of instruments that
qualify as "securities" under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),"m
regulations thereunder, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
102. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1988)
(providing that rules of SEC, together with official securities self-regulatory organizations,
such as National Association of Securities Dealers, shall regulate registered OTC securities
dealers).
103. NATIONAL Assoc. OF SEC. DEALERS, RULEs OF FAIR PRACTICE, reprinted in NASD
MANUAL (CCII) 2,152 [hereinafter RFP].
104. See id. at art. H, § 2(a) (mandating that dealers subject to regulation of NASD
must have reasonable grounds for believing that any dealer's recommendation concerning
purchase, sale, or exchange of security is suitable for customer). Section 2(a) provides that
the grounds upon which the dealer is to base a reasonable belief are the facts, if any,
disclosed by the customer regarding the customer's other security holdings, financial situa-
tion, and needs. Id. The NASD evaluates dealers' sales efforts on the basis of whether they
reasonably represent "fair treatment" of the customer. NASD BOARD OF GOVERNORS, SR-
NASD-94-49 (1994).
105. See RFP, supra note 103, at art. I, § 2(b) (listing information useful in recom-
mending securities transactions).
106. See id. at art. V, § 1 (listing sanctions for violation of RFP).




Act)," 8 and regulations thereunder (collectively, the federal securities
laws). 109 Neither the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) nor regulations
promulgated thereunder by the CFTC address the issue of suitability
In early 1994, the SEC, the CFTC, and the United Kingdom Securities
and Investments Board issued a joint statement setting forth an agenda for
the oversight of the OTC derivatives market, including the review of cus-
tomer protection devices. 10 The joint statement requested relevant self-regu-
latory organizations (SROs) to upgrade their suitability requirements to
reflect the nature of the OTC derivatives market."' The joint statement
suggested that SROs ensure that a dealer, when recommending an OTC
derivatives transaction to a customer, possess sufficient information about
the customer and the customer's resources to assess the suitability of the
transaction for the customer, including information indicating whether the




The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws". bear upon all
derivatives dealers, including federally insured banking institutions and
unregistered dealers, to the extent that dealers offer and sell instruments that
108. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (defining "security").
109. Compare RFP, supra note 103, at art. m, § 2(a) (expressly pertaining only to trans-
actions involving securities) with id. at art. I, § 2(b) (pertaining to "the execution of a
[recommended] transaction"). The NASD has advised that the art. Ill, § 2 suitability
requirements govern only the sale of securities. Telephone Interview with National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers, Inc. (Jan. 31, 1995). If a dealer recommended that a customer
undertake a series of related transactions that involved both securities and nonsecurity deriva-
tives instruments designed to act as hedges for such securities positions, the NASD would
argue that if the securities transactions were not properly hedged, the entire transaction, both
securities and nonsecurities, would be unsuitable. Id.
110. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COM-




113. See Securities Act of 1933 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1988) (forbidding fraud in sale
of securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) (forbid-
ding contravention of SEC-promulgated antifraud rules and regulations under Exchange Act);
Exchange Act Rule 1Ob-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-3 (1994) (prohibiting fraud in sale of securi-
ties by registered broker-dealers); id. § 240.1Ob-5 (prohibiting fraud in sale of securities gen-
erally).
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meet the definition of "securities" in the federal securities laws. I4 The fed-
eral securities laws delegate the power to enforce violations of the antifraud
provisions to the SEC.15 The CFTC regulates dealers to the extent that
dealers offer and sell futures contracts and options on futures contracts, in-
cluding some types of swaps, and dealers that qualify as commodity trading
advisors.11 6 The CFTC promulgated a regulation exempting certain swap
agreements and participants in certain swap agreements from all the pro-
visions, except the antifraud provisions, 1 7 of the CEA. "8 Thus, derivatives
dealers that sell or recommend transactions that meet the defimtion of futures
contracts or options on futures contracts, including certain types of swap
agreements, face liability under the antifraud provisions of the CEA.
Until the BT Securities Corporation (BT Securities) settlements, which
the SEC and CFTC announced on December 22, 1994,19 the federal regula-
tory agencies had not determined to what extent, if any, the federal securities
laws and the CEA applied to OTC derivatives trading activities. The CFTC
and the SEC announced a joint settlement with BT Securities related to BT
114. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(providing that SEC shall regulate securities market participants).
115. See Securities Act of 1933 § 8A, 15. U.S.C. § 77h-1 (Supp. V 1993) (providing that
SEC may institute administrative proceedings to enforce antifraud provisions); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 §§ 21, 21C, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u, 78u-i (1988) (same); id. at § 78o(b)(4)
(granting SEC ability to limit activities of, suspend registration of, or revoke registration of reg-
istered dealers that willfully violate federal security and commodity laws).
116. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ la, 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing
that CFTC shall exclusively regulate participants in commodity futures markets and defimng
"commodity exchange advisor"). A commodity trading advisor is a person who, for compensa-
tion or profit, advises others about the value of commodities futures contracts, or recommends
specific transactions. See id. at § la (defining "commodity trading advisor").
117 See Commodity Exchange Act §§ 4b, 4o, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b, 6o (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(forbidding fraud in the sale of commodities futures); 17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (1994) (same). The
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) § 4b applies to all dealers, while § 4o applies only to com-
modity trading advisors and "commodity pool operators." Compare Commodity Exchange Act
§ 4b with Commodity Exchange Act § 4o. The CFTC may seek to enjoin or restrain violations
of the CEA's antifraud provisions in federal court. See Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c), 7
U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing that CFTC may initiate proceedings to enjoin
or restrain violations of CEA in federal court). The CEA makes all violations of commodities
laws felonies punishable by fines up to $1 million. See id. at § 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2)
(classifying violations of CEA as felomes and providing for punishments).
118. See 17 C.F.R. § 35.2 (1994) (exempting certain swap agreements and participants in
swap agreements from all provisions of CEA except antifraud provisions).
119. BT Securities Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7,124, Exchange Act Release No.
35,136, [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 85,477 (Dec. 22, 1994) [hereinafter
BTSecurities, SEC]; BT Securities Corp., 1994 CFTC LEXIS 340 (Dec. 22, 1994) [hereinafter
BT Securities, CFTC].
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Securities's offer and sale of complex counterparty OTC derivatives to Gib-
son Greetings, Inc. (Gibson).1'2 Bankers Trust Corporation (Bankers Trust),
a New York banking corporation, was the counterparty to each derivative
instrument that BT Securities sold to Gibson. 12  Bankers Trust New York
Corporation (BTNY), a publicly-traded bank holding company, owned all
of the outstanding stock of both Bankers Trust and BT Securities.' "
In May 1991, Gibson issued $50 million in notes with an interest rate
of 9.33 %. " After the issuance of the notes, interest rates declined! 4  Be-
cause Gibson could not prepay the notes for a number of years, Gibson con-
sidered engaging in interest rate swaps to effectively reduce the interest rate
on the notes."z Gibson entered into a series of nearly thirty counterparty
derivatives transactions, including amendments to existing derivative mstru-
ments, with BT Securities from November 1991 to March 1994." Over
time, the derivatives that BT Securities sold to Gibson became increasingly
complex, risky, and intertwined. 7 Many of the derivatives had leverage
factors that caused Gibson's losses to increase dramatically in relation to
relatively small fluctuations in interest rates."2 Each of the derivative instru-
ments that BT Securities sold to Gibson was a customized OTC counterparty
agreement and did not trade on any market.129
In the SEC's settlement with BT Securities, the SEC based its jurisdic-
tional claim on the finding that certain counterparty derivatives transactions
between BT Securities and Gibson were "securities" within the meaning of
the federal securities laws."3  Specifically, the "Treasury-Linked Swap"" 1
120. See BTSecurities, SEC, supra note 119; BTSecurities, CFTC, supra note 119.
121. BT Securities, SEC, supra note 119, at 2; BT Securities, CFTC, supra note 119, at 2.
122. TSecurities, SEC, supra note 119, at 2; BT Securities, CFTC, supra note 119, at 2.
123. BTSecurities, SEC, supra note 119, at 3; BT Securities, CFTC, supra note 119, at 3.
124. STSecurities, SEC, supra note 119, at 3; BTSecurities, C7C, supra note 119, at 3.
125. STSecurities, SEC, supra note 119, at 3; BT Securities, CFTC, supra note 119, at 3.
126. STSecurities, SEC, supra note 119, at 3; BT Securities, CFTC, supra note 119, at 3.
127 BTSecurities, SEC, supra note 119, at 3; BTSecurities, CFTC, supra note 119, at 3.
128. BTSecurities, SEC, supra note 119, at 3; BT Securities, CFTC, supra note 119, at 3.
129. BTSecurities, SEC, supra note 119, at 3; BTSecurities, CFTC, supra note 119, at 3.
130. See BT Securities, SEC, supra note 119, at 11 (observing that because certain
denvative instruments sold by BT Securities to Gibson fell within definition of "securities" under
federal securities laws, federal securities antifraud provisions applied to transactions).
131. The terms of the "Treasury-Linked Swap" required Gibson to periodically pay to
Bankers Trust (the counterparty) the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) on the $30 million
(the notional amount). BT Securities, SEC, supra note 119, at 7 In return, Bankers Trust
would make periodic payments to Gibson equal to LIBOR plus 200 basis points on $30 million.
Id. At maturity, Gibson would pay Bankers Trust $30 million; Bankers Trust would pay Gibson
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and the "Knock-Out Call Option,"132 together with their amendments, quali-
fied as securities. 33 The SEC observed that the Treasury-Linked Swap, al-
though labeled a swap, was actually an option on a security " Accord-
ingly, the SEC ruled that the Treasury-Linked Swap fell within the federal
securities laws' defimtion of "security "'I' Likewise, the SEC found that
the Knock-Out Call Option was an option on a security and thus a "securi-
ty" for the purposes of the federal securities laws.' 36
Because certain transactions between BT Securities and Gibson fell
within the defintion of securities in the federal securities laws, the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws applied to the transactions.' 37
The SEC found that BT Securities had engaged in material misrepresen-
tations and omssions in BT Securities's offer and sale of the Treasury-
Linked Swap and the Knock-Out Call Option, together with their amend-
the lesser of $30.6 million or an amount equal to:
103 x 2-yr. Treasury yld.
$30M 1 - .88%- 30-yr. Treasury price
$ 30M x I -4 . 810 100
Id.
132. The "Knock-Out Call Option" was, in simplest terms, an option contract. BT
Securities, SEC, supra note 119, at 8 n.7 BT Securities sold the Knock-Out Call Option to
Gibson for a fee, or an option premium. See id. at 9 (referring to transactional fees charged
to Gibson for entering into Knock-Out Call Option). The terms of the Knock-Out Call Option
required Bankers Trust (the counterparty) to pay Gibson, on the settlement date, an amount
equal to:
(6.876% - Yield at Maturity of 30-year U.S. Treasury security) x 12.5 x $25,000,000.
Id. at 8. However, if at any time during the life of the Knock-Out Call Option the yield
on the 30-year U.S. Treasury security dropped below 6.48%, the option expired - or
was "knocked out" - and became worthless. Id. In addition, the Knock-Out Call Option
was not "exercisable" until the settlement date. Id. BT Securities marketed the Knock-Out
Call Option as a hedging strategy to reduce the market risk of the Treasury-Linked Swap.
Id. Specifically, the value of the Knock-Out Call Option would rise as the value of the
Treasury-Linked Swap fell, and vice versa. See id. at 7, 8 (providing terms of Treasury-
Linked Swap and Knock-Out Call Option, which show inverse relationship between
instruments).
133. See rd. at 6 n.6, 7, 8 & n.7 (determining that Treasury-Linked Swap and Knock-Out
Call Option, together with amendments, were securities within meaning of federal securities
laws).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 7
136. Id. at 8 & n.7, 9
137 Id. at 11.
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ments.131 Accordingly, the SEC determined that BT Securities violated
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 139 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
140
and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5' 41 when BT Securities entered into the trans-
actions. 1
42
The SEC cited several specific incidents of misrepresentation.'43 For
example, when Gibson asked BT Securities for valuations of Gibson's
derivative positions, BT Securities provided valuations that significantly
understated Gibson's losses.'" In addition, the SEC found that BT
Securities had omitted material valuation information when BT Securities
proposed new transactions or amendments to existing transactions."4 ' BT
Securities also provided false valuations of Gibson's derivatives positions
when Gibson asked BT Securities to provide valuations for use in prepanng
Gibson's year-end financial statements."' Gibson, relying on the false
valuations, filed financial statements that materially understated Gibson's
losses from derivatives activities. 47 Accordingly, the SEC found that BT
Securities caused violations of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act14' and
138. Id.
139. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988).
140. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
141. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
142. BT Securities, SEC, supra note 119, at 11.
143. See id. at 4-9 (citing specific incidents of BT Securities's fraudulent conduct).
144. Id. at 4-6. The SEC opinion included transcripts of telephone conversations be-
tween BT Securities employees. Id. at 4-5. In one conversation, a BT Securities employee
advised another about how to hide misstatements made to Gibson:
I think that we should use this [downward market pnce movement] as an opportunity.
We should just call [the Gibson contract], and maybe clup away at the differential a
little more. I mean we told lum $8.1 million when the real number was 14. So now
if the real number is 16, we'll tell him that it is 11. You know, just slowly chip away
at that differential between what it really is and what we're telling him.
Id.
145. See id. at 7, 9 (observing that BT Securities omitted relevant information concern-
ing Gibson's derivatives positions as well as transaction costs and opportunity costs associated
with entering into new agreements or amendments to existing agreements). In short, BT
Securities repeatedly failed to disclose adequately to Gibson how a proposed agreement or
amendment would affect Gibson's overall position in terms of unrealized gains, fees, and
risks. Id.
146. See id. at 5-6 (describing Gibson's requests to BT Securities for valuations of
Gibson's derivatives positions to assist Gibson in preparing year-end financial reports and
describing BT Securities's quotatuon of false values).
147 Id. at 10-11.
148. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1988).
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Exchange Act Rules 13a-1149 and 12b-20 5 ' when Gibson filed the mislead-
ing financial statements.151
The SEC observed that the derivatives that BT Securities sold to Gib-
son were so complex that sophisticated computer models were the only
means of valuation, and, moreover, that Gibson depended solely on BT
Securities to value Gibson's positions.152 Furthermore, the opinion clearly
indicated that Gibson relied heavily on the advice of BT Securities con-
cering the suitability of the derivatives transactions. 15' However, SEC
officials emphasized that the BT Securities enforcement action involved
only fraud, not suitability or sales practice.' 54
The same day that the SEC announced the BT Securities settlement,
the SEC issued a release exempting dealers of certain OTC derivative
instruments, to the extent that such instruments fall within the definition of
"securities" under the federal securities laws, from Section 15(a) the
Exchange Act, 155 which requires securities dealers to register with the
SEC.'56 Specifically, the exemption applies to any dealer that engages in
individually negotiated, cash-settled OTC options on debt securities, or
groups, or indexes of debt securities. The exemption, however, covers
only transactions that participants document as "swaps" and that qualify for
exemption under the CEA. 157 The SEC issued the exemption in an effort
149 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (1994).
150. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1994).
151. BTSecurities, SEC, supra note 119, at 11.
152. Id. at 3-4.
153. See id. at 7-9 (observing that Gibson entered into every amendment to its Treasury-
Linked Swap and Knock-Out Call Option agreements that BT Securities proposed over eight
month period).
154. See SEC News Release 94-180, at 1 (Dec. 22, 1994) (quoting remarks made by
William R. McLucas, SEC Director of Enforcement, to effect that BT Securities case was
fraud, not suitability case). The BT Securities case did not attempt to address the issue of
suitability or sales practice apart from enforcing antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. Interview with Howard Kramer, SEC Associate Director, Division of Market Regula-
tion, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 20, 1995).
155. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1988) (forbidding
offer or sale of securities by unregistered dealers).
156. See Order Exempting Certain Brokers and Dealers From Broker-Dealer Registra-
tion, Exchange Act Release No. 35,135, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,476 (Dec. 22, 1994)
(exempting dealers of certain derivative instruments, to extent that such instruments are
"securities," from registration requirement under § 15(a) of Exchange Act). The exemption
is temporary and will expire September 30, 1995. Id. at 5.
157 Id. at 5-6.
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to avoid the possibility of a "short term dislocation" of existing OTC denv-
atives markets that might arise due to legal uncertainty in the wake of the
BT Securities settlement. 58  The exemption, however, allows existing
unregistered dealers of certain derivatives to avoid being subject to NASD-
promulgated sales practice and suitability regulations.
5 9
The CFTC, in its settlement with BT Securities, based its jurisdiction
on a determination that BT Securities qualified as a "commodity trading
advisor" under the CEA160 with respect to its derivatives transactions with
Gibson.161 Specifically, the CFTC deternuned that BT Securities had ac-
knowledged that it had entered into an advisory relationship with Gibson
and thereby qualified as a commodity trading advisor under the CEA.
62
The CFTC found that BT Securities, as a commodity trading advisor, vio-
lated Section 4o(1)(A) of the CEA63 by defrauding Gibson."
The joint settlement with BT Securities established that the SEC and
the CFTC have jurisdiction over many types of OTC swap agreements. Al-
though the agencies have exempted the dealers in such swap agreements
158. See id. at 4, 5 n.3 (explaining that reason for exemption of OTC dealers is to
prevent dislocation of OTC derivatives markets due to legal uncertainty). The SEC release,
however, warned that the SEC did not intend the exemption to permit registered dealers
conducting certain derivatives transactions to move their derivatives activities to unregistered
affiliates. Id. at 5 n.3.
159. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1988) (limiting
jurisdiction of NASD to registered dealers).
160. See Commodity Exchange Act § la(5), 7 U.S.C. § la(5) (Supp. V 1993) (defining
"commodity trading advisor").
161. BT Securities, CFTC, supra note 119, at 15-16; see also infra notes 117-18 and
accompanying text (explaining CFTC's jurisdiction over swap agreements and explaining
effect of exemption for swap agreements).
162. BT Securities, CFTC, supra note 119, at 15-16. The CFTC relied on two state-
ments that BT Securities employees made about Gibson in determining that an advisory
relationship existed between BT Securities and Gibson. Id. at 15. In February 1994, BT
Securities's managing director for the Gibson account told his supervisor that, "from the very
beginning, [Gibson] just, you know, really put themselves in our hands like 96 % And
we have known that from day one." Id. at 15. The managing director also remarked that
"these guys [Gibson] have done some pretty wild stuff. And you know, they probably do not
understand it quite as well as they should. I think that they have a pretty good understanding
of it, but not perfect. And that's like perfect for us." Id.
163. 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The CFTC, however, did not find
that BT Securities had violated CEA § 4b, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The
CFTC would not have had to determine that BT Securities qualified as a commodity trading
advisor if the CFrC had relied on § 4b. See supra note 117 (comparing CEA §§ 4b and 4o).
164. BT Securities, CFTC, supra note 119, at 16.
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from most commodities and securities laws, the antifraud provisions of the
CEA and the federal securities laws apply to these transactions. Therefore,
dealers in such transactions must provide accurate and adequate information
to customers or face liability under these antifraud provisions.
2. Regulation of Derivatives Dealers by Financial
Institution Regulators
Four different federal regulators oversee federally insured banking
institutions and their derivatives practices, both as dealers and as end-
users."'65 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulates
nationally chartered banks.1 66 The Federal Reserve Board oversees state
chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve, and bank holding
companies. 67 The FDIC regulates state chartered banks that are not mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve and, in addition, has some supervisory respon-
sibilities for all federally insured depository institutions. 6' The Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS) oversees both state chartered and federally
chartered thrifts. 69 Neither the FDIC nor the OTS have promulgated suita-
bility requirements.
Banking Circular 277 (Circular 277), 70 released by the OCC in Octo-
ber 1993, lays out specific directives to national banks concerning the risk
management of derivatives. Circular 277 contains descriptions of the risks
that are present in derivatives transactions and advice on how to identify
and manage these risks effectively '.. When discussing credit risk man-
agement, Circular 277 directs bank credit officials that are responsible for
establishing and supervising the derivatives credit lines of customers to
include an analysis of the impact of a proposed derivatives transaction on
165. Suitability requirements imposed by state bank regulators are beyond the scope of
this Note.
166. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing that Comptroller
of Currency shall regulate securities practices of nationally chartered banks).
167 See id. at § 1818 (providing that Federal Reserve Board shall govern securities
practices of banks that are members of Federal Reserve).
168. See id. at § 1818(a)(2)(A)(i) (providing that FDIC may suspend insurance of any
insured bank that engages in "unsafe or unsound practices").
169 See id. at § 1464(c) (providing that Director of Office of Thrift Supervision shall
regulate investment and securities practices of thrifts).
170. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CIRCULAR 277 (Oct. 27, 1993)




the financial condition of a customer in determining the creditworthiness of
the customer and to ensure the full realization of credit risk factors.
17 2
Circular 277 also requires bank officials to assess the applicability of
proposed derivatives transactions to the customer's financial goals.1 73 Cir-
cular 277 further provides that when bank officials believe that a proposed
derivatives transaction may not be "appropriate" for a customer, bank
officials should inform the customer of this fact."7 In such a case, the bank
may follow the customer's wishes to proceed only if the bank documents
both its analysis of the transaction and the information that the bank pro-
vided to the customer. 175
The OCC demes that Circular 277 imposes a suitability standard
on bank derivatives dealers. 7 6 Instead, the OCC contends that Circular
277 merely serves to ensure that banks evaluate the credit risks involved
in derivatives transactions using the same principles that banks use in
nondenvatives transactions. 77 The OCC emphasizes that Circular 277
172. See id. at 36,462 (charging bank credit officers to understand impact of proposed
derivatives transaction on customer's financial condition).
173. See id. (directing bank credit officers responsible for derivatives credit lines to
understand applicability of proposed derivatives transaction to risks that customer seeks to
manage).
174. See id. (directing bank to document both analysis that particular derivatives
transaction is inappropriate and information that bank provides to customer); see also COMP-
TROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR BC-277" RISK MANAGEMENT OF
FINANCIAL DERIvATiVES (OCC 94-31) (May 10, 1994), repnnted in Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 58,717, at 36,473, 36,479 [hereinafter Q&A] (instructing bank that determines that
derivatives transaction is inappropriate for customer to document discussions held with cus-
tomer concerning appropriateness).
175. See CIRCULAR 277, supra note 170, at 36,462 (permitting bank to proceed with
"inappropriate" derivatives transaction if bank documents analysis of transaction and warning
to customer).
176. See Q&A, supra note 174, at 36,478-79 (denying that CIRCULAR 277 imposes
suitability standard on bank derivatives dealers); Telephone Interview with Michael L. Bros-
nan, National Bank Examiner, Capital Markets, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(Feb. 7, 1995) (same).
177 See Q&A, supra note 174, at 36,478-79 (observing that customer's ability to
perform obligations under derivatives transactions depends, m part, on appropriateness of
transaction). Proper credit analysis requires that banks know about their customers' busi-
nesses. Telephone Interview with Michael L. Brosnan, National Bank Examiner, Capital
Markets, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Feb. 7, 1995). The OCC compares a
customer's ability to perform the obligations of a derivatives transaction to a borrower's
ability to repay a loan. Id. The OCC also notes that documenting both a bank's analysis of
a derivatives transaction's appropriateness and the concerns voiced to customers about map-
propriateness would likely aid a bank in the event that a bank-sponsored derivatives trans-
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does not prohibit banks from selling derivatives to unsophisticated cus-
tomers. 1 s
A Federal Reserve Board "SR Letter" entitled Examining Risk Man-
agement and Internal Controls for Trading Activities of Banking Organiza-
tions (SR Letter) contains the Federal Reserve Board's policy concerning
derivatives transactions with unsophisticated customers." 9 Like Circular
277, the SR Letter requires banks to consider a derivatives customer's
sophistication in the determination of credit risk.8 However, in contrast
with Circular 277, the SR Letter also discusses business practices.' The
SR Letter advises banks dealing with "unsophisticated" derivatives custom-
ers to ensure that such customers are aware of the particular risks of each
proposed derivatives transaction.' The SR Letter, however, notes that
customers are ultimately responsible for the transactions that they choose
to undertake. 8 3
On December 5, 1994, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York entered
into a written agreement (Agreement) concerning sales practice and suita-
bility of leveraged derivatives transactions (LDTs) with Bankers Trust New
York Corporation and its subsidiaries (collectively BTNY), including BT
Securities. 4 In the Agreement, BTNY agreed to ensure reasonably that
each LDT customer "has the capability to understand" the elements of any
action turns out to be "unprofitable." Id. In such a case, documentation might help exculpate
the bank in litigation and exonerate the bank m the minds of the public. Id.
178. See Q&A, supra note 174, at 36,479 (stating that CIRCULAR 277 does not prohibit
bank from executing inappropriate derivatives transaction).
179 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, EXAMINING RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INTERNAL CONTROLS FOR TRADING ACTIVITIES OF BANKING ORGANIZA-
TIONS (SR 93-69) (Dec. 20, 1993), reprnted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 58,717, at
36,467 [hereinafter SR LETTER].
180. See id. at 36,470 (directing banks to consider customer's ability to understand and
manage risks inherent in derivatives transaction in assessing credit risk).
181. Compare id. at 36,472 (discussing business practices with respect to deriva-
tives transactions) with CIRCULAR 277, supra note 170, at 36,459 (omitting any mention
of business practices concerning derivatives transactions apart from internal risk manage-
ment).
182. See SR LETTER, supra note 179, at 36,472 (defining "sound business practices" to
include ensuring that unsophisticated derivatives customers are aware of risks of each deriva-
tives transaction). The Federal Reserve notes that customers may be unsophisticated either
generally or with respect to a particular type of transaction. Id.
183. Id.
184. WRITTEN AGREEMENT BY AND AMONG BANKERS TRUST NEW YORK CORP.,
BANKERS TRUST Co., BT SECURITIES CORP., AND FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
(Dec. 5, 1994) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE AGREEMENT].
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LDT that a customer undertakes."' 5 Furthermore, BTNY agreed to provide
each customer with sufficient information to allow the customer to under-
stand the transaction.
1 16
Specifically, the Agreement requires BT to develop written policies
and procedures designed to ensure reasonably that each LDT customer
understands any LDT that a customer undertakes.1 17 The policies and pro-
cedures must provide for disclosure of the basic nature, material terms,
conditions, and risks of proposed LDTs."'8 In addition, these policies and
procedures must provide for the distribution of "term sheets" and "sensitiv-
ity analyses" to customers at the closing of every LDT and upon customer
request.8 9
B. A Summary of the GAO Report's Recommendations Concerning
Regulation of OTC Derivatives Dealers
The GAO Report concluded that present OTC derivatives, trading
practices pose a threat to the global financial system. 1"° In particular, the
GAO Report cautioned that because a few major dealers dominate the OTC
derivatives market,' 9' and because OTC derivatives trading has expanded
linkages among the dealers and end-users and the markets m which the
dealers and end-users trade,' 2 a failure of one of the major dealers could
cause liquidity problems in the markets, which could, in turn, set off a
global financial crisis.193 In addition, the GAO Report observed that the
FDIC insures many of the major OTC derivatives dealers and that a-chain
185. Id. In addition, BTNY agreed to develop and submit to the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York written policies and procedures designed to ensure reasonably that each LDT
customer has the capability to understand all the elements of any LDT a customer undertakes.
Id.
186. Id. In addition, BTNY agreed to develop and submit to the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York written policies and procedures designed to ensure reasonably that BTNY dis-
closes to each LDT customer sufficient information to allow the customer to understand all




190. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 9-14 (summarizing findings that regulatory
gaps in OTC derivatives trading heighten risk of systemic collapse).
191. Id. at 36-37
192. Id. at 37-39.
193. Id. at 107, 123.
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reaction of failures could require a federal bailout far exceeding the savings
and loan disaster. 94
Although the GAO Report concentrated on bank safety and soundness
concerns, deficiencies in risk management, and systemic risk, the GAO
Report also observed that no government agency regulates many OTC
derivatives dealers and expressed alarm over this regulatory "gap." 195 The
GAO Report also noted that each of the five major securities firms that
acted as derivatives dealers in 1993 conducted their derivatives activities
through one or more unregistered affiliates.' 96 According to SEC officials,
the treatment of OTC derivatives under the SEC's capital requirement pro-
visions has influenced registered dealers to conduct derivatives activities
through unregistered affiliates."9
The GAO Report urged Congress to bring the unregulated OTC de-
rivatives dealers under the oversight of federal regulators to ensure that
derivatives regulation is comprehensive.998 The GAO Report suggested two
solutions: (1) expand the jurisdiction of the SEC to include all OTC deriva-
194. Id. at 124-25.
195. See id. at 86-87 (observing that neither SEC nor CFTC directly regulates activities
of OTC derivatives dealers that are not either registered dealers or futures commission mer-
chants).
196. See id. at 87 (observing that each registered securities dealer m survey con-
ducted derivatives activities m one or more unregistered and, thus, unregulated affiliates).
197 See id. at 88-89 (explaining reasons securities dealers use unregistered affiliates
to offer and sell derivatives). The GAO Report observed that the SEC uses the net capital
rule to oversee the financial soundness of registered dealers. Id. at 88. The net capital rule
provides that no dealer shall permit the dealer's aggregate indebtedness to eRceed 15 times
the dealer's net capital. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(ii) (1994). The rule allows a dealer
to include the value of all the assets, including securities, held by the. dealer in calculating
the dealer's net capital. Id. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2). Under the rule, however, a dealer must
discount the value of the assets, including securities, held by the dealer by various amounts
(called "haircuts") depending on the liquidity and riskiness of the assets. GAO REPORT,
supra note 16, at 88. In applying the net capital rule to swaps, registered dealers are to add
to their net worth the value of any swaps with unrealized positive market value and subtract
from their net worth the value of any contracts with a negative market value. Id. In
addition, however, dealers must deduct from their net worth calculation, the value of any
swap payments due to them as unsecured receivables. Id. at 89. Dealers must further
reduce any swap with a positive market value by up to 6% of the notional amount of the
contract, depending on the term of the swap and whether the dealer has offset or hedged
the swap. Id. The net capital rule also requires dealers to subtract various percentages of
the market value of other derivatives when calculating net capital. Id. Therefore, deriva-
tives can tie up large portions of a registered dealer's capital. Id.
198. GAO Report, supra note 16, at 127
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tives dealers199 and (2) divide responsibility for regulating OTC derivatives
dealers among the various securities, commodities, and financial regulators
on the basis of each agency's expertise and mission.2°
C. Proposed Legislation Affecting Suitability Requirements for
OTC Derivatives Dealers
Of all the legislation governing derivatives that legislators introduced
in 1994 and 1995, only one bill, House Bill 4745 (HB 4745), endeavored
to fill the perceived gap in the regulation of OTC derivatives dealers."' In
its most basic terms, HB 4745 would amend the Exchange Act to include
derivatives within the definition of "securities."20 2 HB 4745 would encom-
pass virtually all OTC derivatives dealers because the legislation broadly
defines "derivative. 20 3  The bill would require every OTC derivatives
dealer to either (1) register with the SEC as a securities dealer if the
participant is not affiliated with a registered securities dealer or (2) notify
the SEC in writing that the participant is a derivatives dealer if the
participant is "materially associated" with a registered securities dealer.204
HB 4745 would subject all dealers that must register with, or notify,
the SEC of derivatives activity to all the provisions of the federal securities
laws, including the antifraud provisions. 2' The bill also would expressly
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Compare H.R. 4745, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1994) (providing that SEC
shall have jurisdiction over OTC derivatives dealers) with H.R. 31, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (pertaining only to financial institutions) and H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(same) and S. 2291, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (same) and H.R. 4503, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994) (same) and S. 2123, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (same) and H.R. 4170, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (same) and H.R. 3748, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (same).
202. See H.R. 4745, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1994) (amending definition of
"securities" in Securities Exchange Act § 3(10) to include "derivatives").
203. See id. § 2 (defining derivative to include any instrument that derives its value
from value or performance of any security, currency exchange rate, or interest rate).
204. See id. § 101 (prohibiting sale of derivatives by unregistered dealers unless dealer
is "materially associated" with another registered dealer and has notified SEC of derivatives
activity). HB 4745 would require not only derivatives dealers to register with the SEC, but
the bill also would require any entity that buys, sells, or enters into OTC derivative instru-
ments for that entity's own account to register. Id. HB 4745, however, would allow the
SEC to unconditionally exempt any derivatives market participant or class of participants
from the registration requirement. Id.
205. See id. (subjecting dealers willfully violating any provision of federal securities
laws to suspension or revocation hearings under § 15(b)(4) of Exchange Act).
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delegate to the SEC the authority to promulgate additional rules and regula-
tions designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts in de-
rivatives transactions.' In addition, HB 4745 would require all derivatives
dealers that are required to register with the SEC also to register with the
NASD 207 This registration requirement would subject such dealers to the
NASD's rules, including sales practice requirements. 28
IV An Analysis of OTC Derivatives Dealer Suitability Requirements
All sides agree that derivatives are useful and important to the econ-
omy 209 Commentators and regulators have repeatedly warned against
enacting inappropriate initiatives designed to regulate derivatives.210 The
GAO Report itself acknowledged that unilateral regulatory action by the
United States could hamper American firms' competitiveness and encour-
age these firms to move their derivatives activities off-shore."'
The GAO Report expressed concern over the gap in regulation of
unregistered OTC derivatives dealers.212 The SEC, however, preserved the
gap in December 1994 by exempting unregistered dealers that engage in
certain derivatives transactions from SEC registration to the extent that the
206. Id.
207 See id. (requiring every derivatives dealer to register with securities association).
Currently, the NASD is the only such securities association. The bill, however, would allow
the SEC to unconditionally exempt any derivatives dealer or class of derivatives dealers from
the securities association registration requirement. Id.
208. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text (explaining NASD's rules regarding
sales practice).
209 See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 123 (describing derivatives as important to
global financial marketplace); GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 62, at 63 (enumerating benefits
of financial innovation); Culp & Mackay, supra note 41, at 39-40 (describing benefits of OTC
derivatives to end-users and dealers).
210. See Derivatives Market: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Bankng, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board) (warning that singling out derivatives for special regulatory treatment
would be "serious mistake"); Culp & Mackay, supra note 41, at 48 (proposing new type of
risk inherent in derivatives - "regulatory risk"); Thomas C. Theobald, Regulatory Choke-
hold: Derivatives Aren't the Danger, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1994, at A14 (arguing that mar-
ket forces will provide more efficient oversight of derivatives than new government regula-
tion).
211. GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 107 (warning that excessive regulation will drive
derivatives activities overseas); see also Culp & Mackay, supra note 41, at 50 (same).
212. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (describing GAO Report's concern
over unregulated OTC derivatives dealers).
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dealers offer and sell securities.213 The SEC recogmzed that forcing
previously unregulated derivatives dealers to register with the SEC and thus
subjecting these dealers to stringent capital, reporting, and sales practice
requirements, nught result in a "dislocation" of existing OTC derivatives
markets.214 The Group of Thirty's survey also played down the need to
close the gap in regulation.215
Regulators impose suitability requirements on dealers for two principal
reasons:2 16 (1) to reduce dealers' credit risk exposure 217 and (2) to protect
unsoplusticated customers. 1 First, suitability requirements reduce dealers'
credit risk exposure by forcing dealers to include an evaluation of the
suitability of a proposed derivatives transaction in assessing the credit-
worthiness of prospective derivatives counterparties.2 1 9 Second, suitability
requirements protect unsophisticated customers by forcing dealers to assess
the appropriateness of derivatives transactions that dealers undertake with
customers.' The credit risk exposure of derivatives dealers concerns bank
regulators more than securities and commodities regulators.221 Both bank
213. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text (describing SEC's order exempting
certain swaps dealers from SEC's registration requirement).
214. See Order Exempting Certain Brokers and Dealers From Broker-Dealer Registra-
tion, supra note 156, at 5 n.3 (explaining that SEC issued exemption to avoid dislocation of
current OTC derivatives markets); cf. Municipal Bond and Government Securities Markets:
Hearngs Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995) (prepared testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission) (stating that SEC staff will analyze how rules regarding capital requirements
and sales practice apply to OTC derivatives markets m preparation for expiration of exemp-
tion).
215. See GROUP OF TEIRTY, supra note 62, at 63 (observing that unregulated derivatives
dealers have promoted competition and innovation without any evidence of increased systemic
risk).
216. Regulators also impose suitability requirements to protect the reputations of the
entities they regulate. See supra note 177 (describing effects of suitability requirements on
reputation of bank). Suitability requirements protect dealers' reputations by ensuring that
dealers act fairly when dealing with unsophisticated counterparties. See id.
217 See supra note 177 and accompanying text (explaining that appropriateness require-
ment in Circular 277 reduces credit risk).
218. See supra notes 103-05 (explaining how NASD's RFP seek to protect unsophisti-
cated customers).
219. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (explaining that Circular 277"s appropri-
ateness requirement is designed to reduce unperceived credit risks of banks).
220. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (describing NASD's suitability stan-
dard).
221. Compare CIRCULAR 277, supra note 170 and SR LETTER, supra note 179 (both
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regulators and securities regulators, however, seek to protect unsophisti-
cated customers. 222  Because experts generally agree that regulation of
federally insured banks' credit risk exposure is necessary, if not beneficial,
the remainder of this Note will evaluate suitability requirements designed
to protect unsophisticated customers.
Suitability provisions alter the traditional arms-length relationship
between buyers and sellers by requiring derivatives dealers to protect their
customers' interests. 3 Markets function most efficiently when parties to
a financial transaction are free to enter into the transaction unhampered by
a perceived need to serve the interests of their counterpartes.224 Suitability
requirements would increase transaction costs in the derivatives market.
Relationships between buyers and sellers in the derivatives market,
however, can differ from such relationships in other markets. Denva-
tives dealers often advise clients and recommend specific transactions.m
In an advisory relationship, a dealer's profit motive conflicts with the
stating that appropriateness requirements serve to reduce bank credit risk exposures) with
RFP, supra note 103, at art. HI, § 2 (imposing suitability requirement, but not to reduce
dealer credit risk exposure).
222. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text (explaining that Federal Reserve's
Written Agreement with BTNY sought to protect prospective derivatives customers); supra
notes 103-05 and accompanying text (explaining how, NASD's RFP seeks to protect
customers).
223. See DERIVATIVES POLICY GROUP, FRAMEWORK FOR VOLUNTARY OVERSIGHT 37
(1995) (stating that OTC derivatives transactions are predominantly arm's-length in nature);
Memorandum from the Drafting Committee of PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR WHOLESALE
FINANCIAL MARKET TRANSACTIONS 7-8 (Aug. 17, 1995) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review) (same). The Derivatives Policy Group, which consists of six major
OTC derivatives dealers, promulgated FRAMEWORK FOR VOLUNTARY OVERSIGHT m
cooperation with the SEC and CFTC. DERIVATIVES POLICY GROUP, supra, at 1. The
FRAMEWORK FOR VOLUNTARY OVERSIGHT sets out, among other things, a code of conduct
for dealing with denvatives customers that the members of the Derivatives Policy Group have
voluntarily 'agreed to follow. Id. at 1, 37 Likewise, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR
WHOLESALE FINANCIAL MARKET TRANSACTIONS, which was drafted by representatives of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and several financial industry groups, provides a
voluntary set of standards and principles governing the relationship between derivatives
market participants. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR WHOLESALE FINANCIAL MARKET
TRANSACTIONS (1995).
224. See Derivatives Market: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board) (analyzing derivatives dealer-customer relationship).
225. See BT Securities, SEC, supra note 119 (involving derivatives transactions
recommended by dealer); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing alleged
advisory nature of derivatives dealer-customer relationships).
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dealer's responsibility to advise the customer fairly "6 Nonetheless,
customers should recogmze that derivatives dealers that act in an advisory
capacity have conflicting interests and should treat dealer recommenda-
tions accordingly Customers can either rely on their own judgment or
seek advice from tlurd party consultants.2 2 7 The Group of Tiurty's study
concluded that market participants can evaluate for themselves the risks and
benefits of trading with unregulated derivatives dealers.228 Indeed, the
publicity surrounding the huge losses suffered by some derivatives traders
has raised the consciousness of the average unsophisticated derivatives
customer.2 9
Suitability requirements for derivatives dealers enacted to protect cus-
tomers seem mconsistent with the ideals underpinning the federal securities
laws. Whereas securities disclosure provisions seek to protect the average
household investor, derivatives customers are typically major corporations
or professional money managers. 30 Furthermore, whereas securities dis-
closure provisions endeavor to promote confidence and participation in the
securities market, suitability requirements may effectively deny unsophisti-
cated customers access to the derivatives market because the costs of com-
pliance with suitability requirements may dissuade dealers from dealing
with such customers.231
Moreover, the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and
the CEA arguably obviate the need for suitability requirements. Thus far,
one aggrieved derivatives customer that sued a dealer claiming fraud has
settled its suit successfully " In addition, the antifraud laws provide
226. See BT Securities, SEC, supra note 119 (involving advisory relationship in which
dealer misled client as to value of client's derivatives contracts); Derivatives Market:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board)
(discussing advisory nature of some derivatives dealers' relationships with customers).
227 See Saul Hansell, Derivatives Draw More Scrutiny, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 3, 1995, at
C39 (describing derivatives consulting business as fastest growing segment of derivatives
market).
228. GRoup OF THIRTY, supra note 62, at 63.
229. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text (describing recent well-publicized
events involving derivatives).
230. See Culp & Mackay, supra note 41, at 46 (stating that overwhelming majority of
OTC derivatives customers are sophisticated institutional investors).
231. See id. (arguing that suitability requirements will prompt dealers to avoid less
sophisticated customers).
232. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing Gibson's settlement with BT
Securities).
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broader coverage than the current suitability regulations because antifraud
laws apply to derivatives transactions with unregistered dealers.233
In the alternative, suitability provisions may be unnecessary because
market factors will force dealers to ensure that recommended derivatives
transactions are appropriate for unsophisticated customers. Because suita-
bility is a creditworthiness concern,2 34 a dealer that enters into a derivatives
transaction as a counterparty has an incentive to ensure that the transaction
is appropriate for the customer.23 ' Likewise, the market motivates denva-
tives dealers to ensure customer satisfaction and to protect their reputations
for fairness.
V Conclusion
While laws requiring a dealer to consider whether a proposed denva-
tives transaction is appropriate for a customer enhance credit risk manage-
ment by dealers and reduce systemic risk, suitability requirements aimed
at protecting unsophisticated derivatives customers are both unnecessary
and harmful. The current regulatory regime requires most derivatives
dealers to observe the antifraud provisions of the federal securities acts and
the CEA and thus adequately protects customers.
233. See Order Exempting Certain Brokers and Dealers From Broker-Dealer
Registration, supra note 156, at 4 (subjecting unregistered derivatives dealers to antifraud
provisions of federal securities laws to extent that dealers offer and sell securities).
234. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (explaining that suitability is relevant in
creditworthiness analysis).
235. See Culp & Mackay, supra note 41, at 46 (observing that because most derivatives
transactions create long term credit exposures, dealers have incentive to ensure counterparty
suitability).
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